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JURISDICTION
The

Utah

Court

of Appeals

has

jurisdiction

over

this

petition for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(12)
(1994), Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(1) (1993) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(a) (1995 Supp.).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the Commission err in its application of Rule

R568-1-4.J. by refusing to accept Dr. Knorpp's medical report as
evidence on Kimball's claim for workers' compensation benefits?
Standard of review:

The Court of Appeals will review the

Commission's application of the Commission's Rule R568-1-4.J.
under the standard of "reasonableness and rationality".
Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii)

Utah

(1993); Ashcroft v. Industrial

Com'n, 855 P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE RULE
The Commission's Rule R568-1-4.J provides as follows:
All medical records shall be filed by the
employer or its insurance carrier as a single joint
exhibit at least one week before the scheduled
hearing.
Claimant must cooperate and submit all
pertinent medical records contained in his file to the
employer or its insurance carrier for the joint
exhibit submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled
hearing. Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed
binder arranged by care provider in chronological
order. Exhibits should include all relevant treatment
records with the exception of hospital nurses notes.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This proceeding arises from Kimball's
claim against Stampede for medical benefits and temporary total
disability

compensation

pursuant

to

the

Utah

Workers'

Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1 et seq. ("the Act").
The ALJ and the Commission granted Kimball's claim.

Stampede

then sought review by the Utah Court of Appeals.
Proceedings Below: Kimball filed an application for hearing
with the Commission, claiming medical expenses and temporary
total

disability

compensation

for

injuries

working for Stampede on March 15, 1993.

suffered

while

(R.2)

An ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing on Kimball's claim.
At the hearing, Stampede presented Dr. Knorpp's report, which
disputed the necessity of the medical treatment Kimball had
received.

(R. 477)

The ALJ excluded Dr. Knorpp's report from

evidence for two reasons: 1) The report lacked foundation; and
2) The report was a second

independent medical

examination

("IME") and as such, violated Commission rules regarding IMEs.
(R. 266)
Based on the other

evidence which was admitted at the

hearing, the ALJ granted Kimball's claim for benefits. (R. 26 8,
269; the ALJ's decision is attached as Exhibit A.)
filed a motion for review with the Commission.

Stampede

(R. 271)

The

Commission affirmed the ALJ's exclusion of Dr. Knorpp's report,
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but for reasons different from those cited by the ALJ.
Exhibit B.)

(R. 364,

Stampede filed a request for reconsideration (R.

372), which the Commission denied.

(R. 469)

Stampede then petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of
the Commission's decision.
Facts:

On March 15, 1993, Kimball was in a traffic

accident while working for Stampede.

(R. 1)

Stampede paid

Kimball's medical expenses as well as temporary total disability
compensation from March 16 through July 22, 1993. (R.9)

He

returned to work during late July, 1993. (R. 257)
Several

months

later,

headaches. (R. 257, 258)

Kimball

began

suffering

severe

During July 1994, on instruction from

his physician, Kimball left work and received further medical
treatment. (R. 49)

Kimball then requested additional workers'

compensation benefits
continuing

medical

industrial accident.

from Stampede on the theory that his

complaints

were

caused

by

his

prior

Kimball's claim was supported by the

medical opinion of his treating physician. (R. 84, R. 98)
Despite the various medical opinions supporting Kimball's
claim, Stampede denied Kimball's request for additional workers'
compensation benefits. (R. 9, 10)

Stampede also employed Dr.

Yelton to perform an IME of Kimball. (R. 6)
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In the meantime,

Kimball filed an application for hearing with the Commission to
compel Stampede to pay his medical expenses and temporary total
disability compensation. (R. 2)
On October 5, 1994, Dr. Yelton submitted his report to
Stampede.

Dr. Yelton agreed with the medical

opinions

of

Kimball's treating physicians that Kimball's continuing medical
problems were due to his industrial accident.

Dr. Yelton also

concluded that Kimball's continuing medical care was reasonably
necessary. (R. 38-40)
On November 1, 1994, the Commission's Adjudication Division
instructed Stampede to answer Kimball's application for hearing.
(R. 7,8)
denying

Stampede answered on November 14, 1994, generally
liability.

(R.

9-13)

On

January

3,

1995,

the

Adjudication Division set the matter for a formal evidentiary
hearing to be held on March 7, 1995. (R. 14)
On
provide

February
him

20, 1995, Kimball

with

a

copy

of

the

requested
complete

that
medical

Stampede
record

pertaining to Kimball's claim. (Respondent Kimball's brief, page
9.)

On February 22, 1995, Stampede mailed a copy of the medical

record to Kimball.

In its cover letter, Stampede represented

that the record was complete except for "updates from a couple
4

of

providers''.

(Petitioner

Kimball's

brief,

Appendix

B)

Stampede's letter did not disclose that Stampede intended to
obtain and submit Dr. Knorpp's evaluation of Kimball's claim.
On

February

27,

1995,

nearly

two

months

after

the

Adjudication Division had scheduled the evidentiary hearing and
only 10 days before the date of the hearing, Stampede employed
Dr. Knorpp to submit his evaluation of the medical necessity of
Kimball's treatment.

(R. 273)

Dr. Knorpp's report was not

submitted to Kimball's attorney until late in the afternoon of
March 6, 1995, the day before the evidentiary hearing nor was
the

report

included

in

the

medical

compiled pursuant to Rule R568-1-4.J.

exhibit

that

(R. 477)

Stampede

Dr. Knorpp's

report was not submitted to the ALJ until after the evidentiary
hearing had commenced. (R. 477)
Kimball borrowed money in order to travel from Indiana to
Utah

for the evidentiF?~y hearing.

(R.555)

At no time

did

Stampede request a continuance of the evidentiary hearing so
that Dr. Knorpp's report could be

included

in the medical

records and submitted to Kimball and the ALJ in conformity with
Rule R568-1-4.J.
The ALJ
grounds

it

refused to accept Dr. Knorpp's
lacked

foundation
5

and

report

contravened

on the

Industrial

Commission rules.

(R. 265-268) Based on the evidence that was

admitted at the evidentiary hearing, the ALJ concluded that no
medical controversy existed which required referral of Kimball's
claim to a medical panel and that Kimball was entitled to the
requested

medical

expenses

and

temporary

total

disability

compensation. (R. 268)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule R568-1-4.J. required Stampede to submit all medical
records to the ALJ and Kimball's counsel at least one week prior
to the evidentiary hearing.

Although Stampede had two months'

advance notice of the date of hearing, Stampede did not submit
Dr. Knorpp's report until the day of the hearing.

Even when it

was obvious to Stampede that Dr. Knorpp's report would not be
available in time to properly submit it as part of the medical
record, Stampede did not request a continuance of the hearing.
The purpose of Rule R568-1-4.J. is to allow all parties and
the ALJ an opportunity

to evaluate the medical

evidence in

advance of the evidentiary hearing and to avoid unfair surprise.
The rule results in speedier adjudication of injured workers'
claims and reduces the costs of litigation to all parties.
refusing

to

Commission

condone
acted

Stampede's

reasonably

and

violation

of

rationally

the
to

efficiency and integrity of the hearing process.
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By

rule,

the

protect

the

POINT ONE:
THE COMMISSION'S RULE R568-1-4.J. IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AND THE
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT.
The Commission is authorized to conduct its proceedings "in
such a manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly
the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act."
§35-1-88

(1994); emphasis added.

Utah Code Ann.

The Commission is granted

broad discretion with respect to the manner in which it conducts
its investigations.

Unless a party shows the deprivation of

some substantial right, the appellate courts will not interfere
with the Commission's conduct of its hearings.

Spencer v.

Industrial Com'n. 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618 (Utah 1933).
Likewise, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-l et seq., (1993) ("UAPA") acknowledges the ability
of

agencies

such

as

the

Commission

to

promulgate

rules

"affecting or governing adjudicative proceedings" provided such
rules conform to the requirements of UAPA.
Pursuant to the foregoing authority, the Commission has
promulgated Rule R568-1-4.J.

The rule requires that " (a)11

medical records shall be filed by the employer or its insurance
carrier as a single joint exhibit at least one week before the
scheduled hearing."

(Emphasis added.)

The purpose of Rule R568-1-4.J.
medical

evidence which

is critically

7

is to insure that the
important

in workers'

compensation claims is available to the parties and the ALJ
prior

to

the

efficient
unfair

evidentiary

hearing.

means

of disclosure

surprise.

Full

facilitates

voluntary

of

The

rule

provides

evidence while

disclosure

settlement.

of

preventing

medical

In cases

an

evidence

that

are not

settled, the rule allows the evidentiary hearing to focus on the
precise
workers'

points

of

dispute.

compensation

claims

As

a

result,

is

speedy

and

adjudication

of

economical,

in

keeping with the legislature's admonition to the Commission in
§88 of the Act "to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workers'
Compensation Act."
POINT TWO:

STAMPEDE VIOLATED RULE R568-1-4.J.

By its plain language, Rule R568-1-4.J. is mandatory.

It

requires the defendant, in this case Stampede, to submit all
medical records to the applicant and the ALJ at least one week
prior to the evidentiary hearing.
On January 3, 1995, the Commission's Adjudication Division
notified Stampede that the evidentiary hearing on Kimball's
claim would be held on March 7, 199 5.

(R.14)

By January 3,

1995, Stampede had already received the report from its own
doctor, Dr. Yelton.
physicians

that

Dr. Yelton agreed with Kimball's treating

Kimball's

medical

treatment

and

continuing

disability were due to his industrial accident. (R.38-40)
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Therefore, on January 3, 199 5, Stampede knew that it had no
medical evidence to support its denial of Kimball's claim.
For the next seven weeks, Stampede did nothing to obtain
the medical evidence it required.

Then, on February 27, 1995,

one week prior to the hearing, Stampede retained Dr. Knorpp to
evaluate Kimball's medical condition and treatment. (R.27 3) Dr.
Knorpp mailed his report to Stampede on March 3, 1995.

Stampede

in turn faxed the report to Kimball's attorney on the eve of the
evidentiary hearing.

Stampede did not submit the report to the

ALJ until the evidentiary hearing had commenced on March 7,
1995.

(R. 477.)
The foregoing facts establish that Stampede violated the

mandatory requirements of the Commission's Rule R568-1-4.J.
POINT THREE: STAMPEDE HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE
COMMISSION VIOLATED ITS PAST PRACTICE BY EXCLUDING DR.
KNORPP # S REPORT FROM EVIDENCE.
At page 1 of its brief, Stampede notes that "appellate
review of whether an agency action is contrary to the agency's
prior practice first requires a petitioner to establish a prima
facie case that his or her case was contrary to prior practice,
. . . .
The

(emphasis added; citations omitted)
Commission

agrees

with

the

foregoing

statement.

Stampede must prove the Commission deviated from prior practice
when it refused to admit Dr. Knorpp's report.

However, Stampede

has made no effort

Stampede has not

to prove that point.

identified any other prior case where the Commission has applied
9

Rule R568-1-4.J. differently than it was applied in this case.
Consequently, Stampede has failed to meet its threshold burden
of showing that the Commission has decided this case contrary to
past practice.
POINT FOUR:
THE COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF RULE
R568-1-4.J. WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
Stampede sets forth a number of complaints regarding the
Commission's application of Rule R568-1-4.J.

First, Stampede

argues it is unfair for the Commission to exclude Dr. Knorpp's
report while permitting other medical records to be submitted
after the evidentiary hearing.

However, neither the parties nor

the ALJ objected to the late admission of such other medical
records.

In

contrast,

both

the

ALJ

and

Kimball

raised

objections to Dr. Knorpp's report and the report was excluded
from evidence.
Stampede

also

argues

application

of

unilaterally

and arbitrarily

medical

evidence

Rule

that

under

R568-1-4.J.,

simply

the

"(e)ither

Commission's
party

prevent admission of

by

refusing

to

can

essential

stipulate

to

its

submission less than seven days before the hearing." (Stampede's
brief, page 16.)
The answer to Stampede's concern is simple.

If Stampede

submits its medical exhibit within the time limits of Rule R56 81-4. J,

there

is

no

need

to

stipulate

to

submission

and,

therefore, no opportunity for "arbitrary" exclusion of evidence.
10

Next, Stampede contends the Commission's suggestion that
Stampede should have requested a continuance "would certainly
have caused undue hardship on Kimball, who had traveled from
Indiana, . . .

to say nothing of the burden on the Commission's

administrative system."

The Commission did not mean to suggest

that it would have been reasonable for Stampede to wait until
the evidentiary hearing to request a continuance.

Any such

request should and could have been made earlier.
By

January

3,

199 5,

Stampede

evidentiary hearing on March 7, 1995.
medical

evidence

to

support

its

knew

that

it

faced

an

It also knew it had no
position.

Under

such

circumstances, Stampede could have taken prompt action to obtain
the medical evidence or requested a continuance well in advance
of the hearing.

If Stampede had made a timely request for

continuance, Kimball would not have been forced to borrow money
to travel to Utah and the ALJ could have adjusted her hearing
calendar accordingly.
Finally,
dismissed"

Stampede
its

claims

defenses

to

the

Commission

Kimball's

"summarily

claim.

characterization of the Commission's action is incorrect.

That
The

Commission considered the admissibility of Dr. Knorpp's report
and rejected the report as untimely under Rule R568-1-4.J.

The

Commission then considered the merits of Kimball's claim and
ruled in his favor.

There was no summary disposition in this

case.
11

POINT FIVE:
R5 6 8 -1-4.J.
COMMISSION.

STAMPEDE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE
WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL

Stampede contends that Kimball waived any objection he
might have made pursuant to Rule R568-1-4.J. to Dr. Knorpp's
report.

The Commission agrees with Kimball's reply, set forth

as Point V.B of Kimball's brief.

However, the Commission wishes

to make an additional comment on the issue.
As a general principle, the Court of Appeals "will not
reverse a trial court's determination on the admissibility of
evidence absent an abuse of discretion

impacting

a party's

substantial rights." Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P. 2d 309, 311 (Utah
App. 1992).

In workers' compensation cases, the above-stated

rule of deference has statutory underpinnings.

As previously

noted, §35-1-88 of the Act authorizes the Commission to conduct
its proceedings in "such a manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties
and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workers' Compensation
Act. "
The Commission has an independent statutory duty to insure
that the adjudicatory process is fair to all parties and serves
the purposes of the workers' compensation system.
not

Kimball

relied

upon

Rule

R568-1-4.J.

in

Whether or

opposing

the

admission of Dr. Kimball's report, the Commission was entitled
to enforce its own the rule.
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CONCLUSION
The Utah legislature has directed the Commission to use its
judgment in conducting workers' compensation proceedings in a
manner that is fair to the parties and serves the purposes of
the workers' compensation system.

To that end, the Commission

promulgated Rule R568-1-4.J. to insure that all parties will
have advance knowledge of medical evidence.

The Commission's

application of its Rule R568-1-4.J. is entitled to deference, so
long as it is within the limits of reason and rationality.
Stampede failed to comply with the requirements of Rule
R568-1-4.J.

It also failed to show any reasonable excuse for

its noncompliance.
the

Commission's

practice.

Finally, Stampede has failed to show that
action

in this matter

deviates

from

past

The Commission therefore respectfully requests the

Court of Appeals to affirm the Commission's decision.
Dated this 25th day of July, 1996.

A^-U-UX

Alan Hennebold
General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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Exhibit A
ALJ'S DECISION

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 94-967

JOHN R. KIMBALL,
Applicant,

vs.
STAMPEDE TRUCKING/WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

*

Defendants.
« * * * * I A A J * * A r * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March
7, 1995 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES;

The applicant was present and was represented by T.
Jeffery Cottle, Attorney.
The defendants were represented by Carrie Taylor,
Attorney.

This case involves a claim for additional temporary total
compensation and medical expenses related to a work-related March
15, 1993 motor vehicle accident. The carrier initially accepted
liability and paid temporary total compensation (at $367.00/week,
totaling $3,077.57) and medical expenses from March 16, 1993
through July 22, 1993. Thereafter, the applicant returned to work
and worked through July 22, 1994. At that time, the applicant was
taken off work by his treating physician, due to neck and upper
back symptoms similar to what he had had during 1993, after the
industrial motor vehicle accident. The applicant remained off work
from July 22, 1994 until the date of hearing, and received medical
care during that period of time. At the hearing, the applicant
indicated that he had not yet been released to return to work by
his physician and was continuing with medical care related to the
industrial motor vehicle accident. The applicant claims additional
temporary total compensation from July 22, 1994, the date that he
began his off-work status again, through the date of hearing, and
continuing until he becomes medically stable. The applicant also
claims additional medical expenses for additional treatment
reinstituted on July 22, 1994, related to neck and upper back pain
associated with headaches.

t r-o

ORDER
RE: JOHN R. KIMBALL
PAGE 2

The carrier denies that the applicant is entitled to
additional temporary total compensation and medical expenses,
because his treating physician, Dr. T. Fenwick, released him to
return to work in July of 1993 and found him medically stable in
October of 1993. In addition, the carrier cites a medical report
prepared by a Dr. S. Knorpp, a physician chosen by the carrier to
review the applicant's medical records and answer specific
questions, which indicates that most of the treatment after July of
1994 was either unnecessary or unrelated to the March 15, 1993
industrial motor vehicle accident, and which indicates that the
applicant was not disabled after July of 1994.
The carrier
indicates that it believes that the applicant sought out the
additional medical care and time off work in order to increase his
special damages for a third party law suit that he is pursuing
against the insurance carrier for the driver of the vehicle that
struck him on March 15, 1993. The carrier points out that the
applicant was able to return to his regular work shortly following
the industrial accident and was able to continue working for a full
year thereafter. Based on this history, the motivation to increase
his recovery in his third party action, and the opinions of Dr. S.
Knorpp, the carrier contends that the additional treatment and time
off work is unrelated to the industrial motor vehicle accident of
March 15, 1993.
The applicant responds to the carrier's denial, indicating
that the opinion of Dr. S. Knorpp should not be admissable, due to
procedural concerns, and because Dr. Knorpp never examined him.
The applicant states that, in October of 1994, the carrier actually
arranged for him to see a physician of its choice, Dr. J. Yelton,
in Indiana, where he now resides. Dr. Yelton examined him and
reviewed his treatment and progress since the date of injury. Dr.
Yelton specifies in his report to the carrier that the treatment
that the applicant had been receiving since July of 1994 was
reasonable and was related to the March 15, 1993 industrial
accident. The applicant argues that the carrier was not happy with
the conclusions of Dr. Yelton, its own chosen physician, and sought
out another opinion from Dr. Knorpp, just prior to the hearing.
The applicant argues that the Industrial Commission rules do not
allow the carrier to obtain an unlimited number of different
medical opinions in an attempt to find one that will support its
position that no further treatment or benefits are reasonable. The
applicant argues that the carrier chose its physician for offering
a second opinion when it requested him to see Dr. Yelton and that
the carrier should be required to abide by Dr. Yelton's
recommendations, rather than the after-acquired opinion of Dr.
Knorpp. The applicant argues that Dr. Knorpp's opinion should also
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be dismissed, because it is not properly founded. The applicant
points out that Dr. Knorpp merely reviewed his medical records and
did no phyisical examination of him. The applicant argues that Dr.
Knorpp cannot offer a reliable opinion about what treatment is, or
is not, warranted, without examining him to see what his condition
is.
The carrier argued at hearing that it is now clear, based
on the opinions of the treating physician, Dr. Yelton and Dr.
Knorpp, that there is a significant medical controversy regarding
the relatedness and the medical necessity of the treatment and time
off work since July 1994 and that, as a result, the ALJ should
refer the dispute to a medical panel for additional input on this
contested issue. The carrier indicated at hearing that it would
have preferred to have the applicant examined by Dr. Knorpp, rather
than have Dr. Knorpp merely do a file review, but cost containment
concerns prevented it from paying to have the applicant come to
Utah for such an examination. The carrier argued that the carrier
itself did not choose Dr. Yelton for the initial second-opinion
evaluation and that this choice was made by an third pary
vocational rehabilitation firm, Intracorp, that had been hired by
the carrier. The carrier argued at hearing that Intracorp did a
poor selection in choosing Dr. Yelton to perform the second-opinion
evaluation, as Dr. Yelton turns out to have the same philosophy
regarding extended treatment as does the applicant's treating
physician. Based on Dr. Knorpp's preferred opinion, the carrier
has denied additional temporary total compensation beginning in
July of.1994, has denied payment on all prescription medication
except anti-depressants (amitrytilline), has denied payment on
physical therapy offered beginning in July of 1994, has denied
payment for diagnostic studies including a head CT, a brain MRI, an
EEG, EMG/nerve conduction velocity testing, and sleep studies, all
accomplished after July of 1994, and has denied payment for all but
3 series of trigger point injections begun in August of 1994.
Updated medical records were received post-hearing, on March
22, 1995, and the matter was considered ready for order at that
time.
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant was hired by Stampede Trucking to work as a
long-haul semi-truck driver in July of 1992.
The applicant
apparently concedes that the prior compensation rate paid to him by
the carrier ($167.00/week) is accurately computed based on his
average weekly wage while employed by Stampede Trucking.
Per
stipulation of the attorneys at hearing, the facts regarding his
March 15, 1993 industrial motor vehicle accident are accurately
reflected in a transcript of the recorded statement that the
applicant gave to the carrier on December 6, 1994. That statement
indicates that the applicant was proceeding through an intersection
in Florida on March 15, 1993 when he was broadsided by a Suburban
pulling a 30-foot trailor. The Suburban struck his vehicle at the
rear axels of his tractor.
The applicant indicates in his
statement that he was wearing a seat belt at the time, without a
shoulder harness. As a result of being struck by the Suburban, the
applicant recalls having his head snapped around to the left and he
recalls slamming his left knee into the the window crank. Per the
recorded statement, the applicant was just 10 miles away from the
site where he was to deliver his load when the accident occurred.
After the accident, the applicant found that his vehicle was
driveable, but only at about 25 miles per hour. He drove the
vehicle to the delivery site and then had another driver who had
been following him give him- a ride to the emergency room.
Per the medical records admitted at hearing (Exhibit D-l),
the applicant was seen at the Mid-Florida Health Center emergency
room in Haines City, Florida, on the same day as the accident, with
complaints of low back pain, upper back pain and neck pain. X-rays
were taken of the cervical spine and the left knee. The cervical
spine X-ray was read to show mild chronic changes at C6, with
minimal lipping and the left knee X-ray was read as normal. The
diagnostic impression is listed as cervical strain and left knee
strain and the applicant was advised to follow-up with a doctor as
soon as possible, when he got back home to Indiana. The applicant
did not immediately return to Indiana at that time, but instead
stayed in Florida at a motel, while his semi-truck tractor was
being repaired. Per the recorded statement, the applicant just
laid in bed at the motel for the next 10 days or so, until the
truck was ready to drive. When it was repaired, he drove it back
to Indiana, but the applicant stated that it took him 4 days to
make the 900-mile trip, because he was able to drive only 1 to 1%
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hours at a time. The applicant stated his driving limitation was
due to pain at the base of his neck, at the top of his shoulder,
between his shoulder blades and in the left knee.
When the applicant got back to Indiana, he was seen at the
Medical Center of Vincennes, in Vincennes, Indiana, on March 28,
1993, apparently by a Dr. Hedde. The handwritten office note for
this visit indicates that the applicant was complaining of pain
between the shoulder blades, in the neck and in the left knee. Some
aching and popping in the neck is noted and the office note
reflects that the applicant was having problems with lifting
things.
A cervical muscle strain and left knee strain were
diagnosed and the applicant was prescribed robaxin (muscle relaxer)
and darvocet (pain medication).
Dr. Hedde followed up with the
applicant on April 6, 1993 and noted that the applicant did not
feel much better. At that time, he referred the applicant on to an
orthopedist, Dr. T. Fenwick of the Vincennes Orthopedic Surgery
Clinic.
Thereafter, Dr. Hedde apparently did refill the
applicant's darvocet prescription several times.
The applicant fist saw Dr. Fenwick on April 8, 1993. Dr.
Fenwick noted left knee symptoms and a prior arthroscopic
menisectomy in 1986. With respect to the neck and upper back, he
noted cervical spine pain at the base of the neck, with popping and
limitation of range of motion, as well as pain between the shoulder
blades. He diagnosed myofacial strain of the neck and upper back
with a left knee contusion causing a traumatic chondromalacia
lesion. He referred the applicant for physical therapy to the neck
and upper back and for knee exercises. He also took the applicant
off work and prescribed darvocet and tylenol. The applicant had 8
physical therapy treatments in April, apparently consisting of
passive modalities (apparently primarily ultrasound) with no relief
to the cervical and thoracic spine. Due to continued symptoms in
the left knee, Dr. Fenwick referred the applicant to Good Samaritan
Hospital in Vincennes on April 27, 1993 for an MRI of the left
knee. This was read to show no evidence of a meniscal tear, but
some thinning of the articular cartilage of the patella.
During May of 1993, the applicant saw Dr. Fenwick twice (on
May 13, 1993 and on May 20, 1993) and got 11 physical therapy
treatments. The physical therapy apparently still consisted of
passive modality treatment and little if any improvement was noted.
Dr. Fenwick decided that it was going to take some time for the
applicant to heal and felt that he needed to be in "real good
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shape" to return to his truck driving, as it required the applicant
to work with heavy tarps. He therefore had the applicant continue
with physical therapy and did not see the applicant again until
July 8, 1993. The applicant got 14 physical therapy treatments in
June of 1993 and 9 treatments in July of 1993. The physical
therapy notes reflect up and down improvement of the applicants
symptoms, but no real lasting steady improvement. Nonetheless,
when Dr. Fenwick saw the applicant on July 8, 1993, Dr. Fenwick
noted that he thought that the applicant's neck was much better.
Pain between the shoulder blades was noted to still exist, but with
improvement.
Some left knee symptoms remained and Dr. Fenwick
decided to have the exercise weights boosted to assist with this.
Dr. Fenwick noted that it was his impression that the physical
therapy was really helping. On July 13, 1993, Dr. Fenwick wrote
the carrier and indicated that he thought that the applicant was
much improved, that his residual neck soreness was expected to
improve within the next 2 weeks and that he anticipted a release to
return to work around that time.
Dr. Fenwick released the
applicant to return to work on July 22, 1993 and indicated that the
applicant should return for follow-up in 6 weeks.
The carrier paid for all of Dr. Fenwick's 1993 treatment and
for the applicant's time off work from March through July of 1993.
The applicant did return to his same job with Stampede Trucking in
late July of 1993.
However, the applicant indicates in his
recorded statement that he did not feel that Dr. Fenwick's
treatment or the physical therapy improved his condition.
He
indicates in that statement that he requested to be released to
return to work, but still had constant pain in his neck and upper
back, along with headaches, when he returned to work in late July
or early August of 1993. He recalls that Dr. Fenwick advised him
not to work on flatbed trailors (apparently due to load maintenance
responsibilities on these trailors) and advised him not to lift
over 50 pounds on a permanent basis. As a result, the applicant
states that he drove only tanker trailors when he returned to work.
He stated that he actually performed truck driving with Stampede,
or leased to another company, through April 15, 1994, when he quit
driving truck, because of a wage dispute with Stampede and because
of back pain and headaches.
The applicant did follow-up with Dr. Fenwick in October of
1993, and at that time. Dr. Fenwick noted continued symptoms in the
knee, at the base of the neck and between the shoulder, blades, all
of which he felt were aggravated by long hours driving truck.
Nevertheless, Dr. Fenwick notes that, at that time, he felt the
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applicant had reached maximum medical improvement. Also in October
1993, the applicant began seeing Dr. J. Rohrer, D.O. for a sinus
infection and accompanying headaches. X-rays of the sinuses and a
CT of the head done at Good Samaritan Hospital, in October of 1993,
at Dr. Rohrer's referral, were read as unremarkable. Dr. Rohrer
tried a number of medications to treat the infection, including
beconase and prednisone. He also prescribed darvocet, apparently
for the headaches.
In late October of 1993, he referred the
applicant to Dr. Bizal, at the Tri-State Otolaryngology clinic in
Evansville, Indiana. Dr. Bizal noted that the applicant smoked and
had a high caffeine intake. He recommended decreased smoking and
caffeine intake, both of which he felt might be contributing to the
development of migraine headaches and sinusitis. From November of
1993 through early July of 1994, Dr. Rohrer was the applicant's
only treating physician, per the medical record exhibit. During
this period of time, it is unclear how often Dr. Rohrer actually
saw the applicant.
His records reflect regular prescription
refills, for the most part for hismanal (apparently an antihistimine), beconase AQ and darvocet.
As noted above, the applicant quit truck driving in April
of 1994 and started working as a sales representative for home
cleaning system. This job required transporting and demonstrating
equipment weighing around 30 pounds.
The applicant did this
through July of 1994, although he began seeing Dr. Fenwick again in
mid-July of 1994.
At that time, Dr. Fenwick noted that the
applicant had recurrence of neck and lower cervical problems, along
with pain in between the shoulder blades, the same as when Dr.
Fenwick first saw the applicant in April of 1993. Dr. Fenwick
notes that the applicant indicated that he never got completely
well previously.
Dr. Fenwick referred the applicant back to
physical therapy, for hot packs and ultrasound treatment,
anticpating following up with the applicant in 3 weeks. The
applicant got 5 treatments in between July 11, 1994 and July 22,
1994, with no improvement noted by the therapist. On July 22,
1994, the applicant called Dr. Fenwick's office complaining of a
severe headache. He was prescribed darvocet, toradol and flexeril
at that time and was also advised to call Dr. Rohrer's office. The
applicant did call Dr. Rohrer's office and Dr. Rohrer added imetrix
to the prescribed medications. Later that day, the applicant was
seen at the Good Samaritan Hospital ER for his headache. The ER
note indicates that the applicant had been having headaches for one
year and that other symptoms included alot of tension and sinus
headaches. It was noted that the applicant had taken 6 darvocet,
1 imetrix and had gone to physical therapy for hot packs and
ultrasound that day, but still had the severe headache.
The
t e«<?:<£*
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applicant was treated with IV compazine, nubain and stadol and was
improved upon release, per the ER records.
The applicants
recorded statement reflects that this trip to the ER is what caused
him to discontinue working as a door-to-door sales representative.
When the applicant saw Dr. Fenwick again on July 25, 1994,
Dr. Fenwick noted the ER visit and opined that the applicant'&
muscular tension headaches might be related to his back and upper
shoulder pain. He decided to continue with the physical therapy
modalities and noted that he anticipated a referral for trigger
point injection therapy if the physical therapy did not improve the
applicant's condition. In his recorded statement, the applicant
indicates that the headaches that he was having in July of 1994
were not the same kind of headaches that Dr. Rohrer was treating
beginning in late 1993. The statement indicates that the headaches
that Dr. Rohrer was treating were sinus headaches located in his
face around his nose. He states that this was not the location of
the headaches that he was having when he began to see Dr. Fenwick
again.
The applicant did have several more physical therapy
treatments in late July and early August 1994 and then Dr. Fenwich
referred the applicant to Good Samaritan Hospital for treatment at
the Pain Clinic by Dr. E. Humphreys.
He also referred the
applicant to Dr. H. Matick, D. 0., apparently for additional
diagnostic work*
The applicant was first seen at the Pain Clinic by Dr.
Humphreys on August 2, 1994. On that date, Dr. Humphreys noted
frontal occipital headaches and severe neck and shoulder pain. It
is noted that the applicant could not tolerate driving or lifting
and had to quit his sales job, because even minor lifting and
turning of his head and shoulders caused intolerable pain. It is
noted that even laying down did not help his symptoms at that
point, with darvocet and toradol making the pain barely tolerable.
It is also noted that the applicant had not had any active physical
therapy to that point. The conclusion was that the applicant had
significant myofacial syndrome and that trigger point injections
might ameliorate a large majority of the symptoms. The injections
offered on that date (trigger point injections to the lower neck
and upper back and bilateral greater occipital nerve blocks)
apparently resulted in at least initial significant pain reduction.
Dr. Humphreys also refilled the applciant's toradol and darvocet on
that day. The injections were repeated one week later, on August
9, 1994, with an indication in the record that the symptoms were
less bothersome after the first set of injections.
When Dr.
Fenwick saw the applicant in follow-up on August 11, 1994, he noted
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that it was his impression that the injections were helping the
headaches, reducing their severity and that he would continue the
applicants off-work status for another 6 weeks while the applicant
continued with the injections.
On August 15, 1994, the applicant saw Dr. H. Matick, D. 0.,
who apparently specializes in neurological diagnostic work. Dr.
Matick's August 15, 1994 letter to Dr. Fenwick indicates that he
wanted to rule out an intracranial mass as a cause of the headaches
and wanted to rule out a herniated cervical disc as well* Dr.
Matick therefore referred the applicant for an MRI of the brain, an
MRI of the cervical spine, EMG studies of the upper extremities,
sleep studies (SSEPs) and he prescribed elavil (an antidepressant) . The applicant had his third set of trigger point
injections and greater occipital nerve blocks on August 16, 1994.
It was noted that the applicant had received 2-3 days of benefit
after the last injections. The medical records reflect that the
results of the diagnostic work recommended by Dr. Matick, D.O. were
as follows: August 17, 1994 EEG done by Dr. Matick was read as
normal, EMG studies done at Good Samaritan Hospital on August 22,
1994 were read as normal for both upper extremities and SSEP
studies done that same day at the hospital resulted in a reading
that was compatible with mild peripheral neuropathy affecting both
upper extremities, MRI of the brain and MRI of the cervical spine
done on August 23, 1994 at <5ood Samaritan Hospital were both read
as unremarkable.
The applicant had has fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh set
of trigger point injections and greater occipital nerve blocks at
Good Samaritan Hospital on August 23, 1994, August 31, 1994,
September 7, 1994 and September 14, 1994. After all of these
injections, it was noted that the applicant's overall pain relief
was at 20%, with some mild improvement in the headaches, but with
no significant improvement in the neck and upper back pain. Most
of the notes documenting the injections indicate that Dr. Humphreys
felt that the injections were not intended to cure the applicant of
all his pain symptoms and that this was not to be expected. The
applicant saw Dr. Fenwick again on September 15, 1994 and he
indicated that the applicant was to remain off work for another 6
weeks, continuing with the injections. Dr. Matick's letter to Dr.
Fenwick, dated September 20, 1994, indicates that he simply
recommended continued medications, with an increase in the elavil
dosage, continued flexeril, an increase in darvocet usage and a
decrease in the toradol. After the applicant's eighth set of
trigger point injections and greater occipital nerve blocks on
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September 21, 1994, Dr. Humphreys noted that there was a 30-35%
overall improvement and he noted that he anticipated eventually
trying the applicant in a work hardening program.
At some point, the carrier apparently sought out the
services of Intracorp, a private vocational rehabilitation firm
with offices all over the country.
Apparently, Intracorp was
requested to assist in the oversight of the applicant's treatment
so as to manage and assist in returning the applicant to work. A
September 25, 1994 report of Intracorp indicates that it was the
impression of the case worker that the trigger point injections
that the applicant was receiving were not providing any relief at
all. The report indicates that it was the intention of the case
worker to send the medical information to a Dr. Yelton for his
review and that the applicant was to be scheduled for an
examination by Dr. Yelton. The applicant did have an examination
performed by Dr. Yelton on October 5, 1994, after he received 2
additional series of trigger point injections on September 28, 1994
and October 5, 1994. After these injections, it was noted that the
applicant felt that he was having less frequent (only once or twice
per week) and less severe headaches and was 30-40% improved.
Dr. Yelton/s October 5, 1994 report summarizes the
applicant's industrial accident and injuries and the treatment and
diagnostic work that he had had to date. In his report, Dr. Yelton
concludes
that
the applicant
had chronic
cervical and
scapulothoracic strain. He noted that the applicant'& headaches
were consistent with this diagnosis and were a result of chronic
muscle tightness in the cervical muscles. Dr. Yelton explains that
this explains why the headaches had a delayed onset. With respect
to the treatment that the applicant was having at that time
(including the trigger point injections, muscle relaxants and
elavil) Dr. Yelton found these to be appropriate and he recommended
continuance of the treatment. He noted that he also recommended
adding heat and massage and stretching/strengthening exercises. He
noted that he felt a slow recovery should be anticipated and he
found that the applicant had not yet reached maximum medical
improvement and thus was not yet ready for a permanent impairment
rating.
The applicant continued with his weekly trigger point
injections and greater occipital nerve blocks. He had his eleventh
through his fourteenth set of injections on October 12, 1994,
October 19, 1994, October 26, 1994 and November 2, 1994. Per the
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accompanying pain clinic notes of Dr. Humphreys, the applicant
remained at 30-40% overall improved after these injections. Dr.
Humphreys also noted that it was safe to say that the applicant
would not be able to ever return to heavy work, but that it was
unclear if he would be released to return to some kind of
functional employment at some point.
On November 3, 1994, Dr. Yelton wrote the carrier apparently
responding to some questions that the carrier had with respect to
his conclusions. , He reiterates in this letter that he felt that
the applicant's headaches were not related to his sinus condition
and were related to chronic cervical and scapulothoracic strain.
He reiterated that a "delayed presentation11 for the headaches was
not inconsistent. He restated his conclusion that the pain clinic
referral and treatment was appropriate for chronic pain syndrome,
which diagnosis he found was common in association with chronic
cervical/scapulothoracic strain. He states in his letter that he
felt that the frequency of the trigger point injections should be
at the discretion of the treating physician.
Apparently in
response to a question regarding the lack of objective physical
findings in the diagnostic studies obtained by Dr. Matick, Dr.
Yelton responds that the lack of objective findings and failure to
confirm radiculopathy, per the MRI, CT and neurological testing,
did not rule out problems of a muscular nature in the neck and
upper back, which he found was the source of the applicant's pain.

The applicant saw Dr. Fenwick again on November 7, 1994 for
follow-up and he kept the applicant off work, recommended continued
injection therapy and referred the applicant to Good Samaritan
Hospital for a functional capacity evaluation (FCE). The FCE was
done on November 8, 1994 and notes that the applicant described his
pain level to be a 10 out of a possible 10. It notes that the
applicant had gained 30 pounds since the date of injury and that he
was under a 10-pound lifting restriction, per the applicant. The
conclusion of the evaluator was simply that it was recommended that
the applicant undergo a therapeutic and conditioning program with
specified work hardening goals to be achieved in 4 weeks.
The applicant got 8 additional series of trigger point
injections and greater occipital nerve blocks on November 9, 1994,
November 16, 1994, December 14, 1994, December 21, 1994, December
29, 1994, January 4, 1995, February 8, 1995 and February 23, 1995.
On December 8, 1994, when the applicant saw Dr. Fenwick for the
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last time, Dr. Fenwick noted that he felt that the applicant did
not need to continue seeing him and that Dr. Humphreys at the pain
clinic could manage his care at that point. Notes accompanying the
pain clinic treatment indicate up and down improvement and
worsening of both the headaches and neck/upper back pain, depending
on the weather and some aggravation" caused by the physical therapy
that was apparently begun again in November of 1994 (no actual
records for this reinstituted therapy are included in the medical
record exhibit) . The pain clinic notes indicate that the applicant
continued to need "opioids11 to manage his pain, in addition to the
injections. After the eighteenth in the series of injections, on
December 21, 1994, Dr. Humphreys noted that the applicant was
approaching a plateau. Dr. Humphreys experimented with adding
dexamethasone and prednisone to the injection therapy in late
December and early January and with a cervical epidural in February
of 1995. He switched from a weekly regimen to a bi-weekly regimen
in February 1995. The last pain clinic note is dated February 23,
1995 and indicates that the applicant had taken some time off
physical therapy and was returning to it at that time.
Dr.
Humphreys noted at that time that he still did not see a very
favorable prognosis for the applicant's longterm problems
associated with the myofascial pain and greater occiptial
neuralgia.
Just prior to the* hearing in this case, the carrier
requested Dr. S. Knorpp to review the applicant's medical records
and respond to some questions that the carrier had with respect to
the medical treatment and time off work that the applicant had been
having in 1994. Dr. Knorrp's report is dated March 3, 1995 and was
made available to the applicant and his attorney just several days
before the March 7, 1995 hearing.
In his report, Dr. Knorpp
reviews the records that were made available to him. The listing
of the records referred to Dr. Knorpp does appear to be fairly
complete.
Dr. Knorpp indicates that he understood that the
applicant was able to complete his delivery on the date of accident
and that no traumatic related pathology was indentified at the
hospital on that date.
He notes that he understood that the
applicant had returned to work from July of 1993 through April of
1994, during which time he was not required to "provide heavy
manual materials handling.w
Dr. Knorpp emphasizes in his report that the applicant's
headache treatment was initially related to sinusitis in October of
1993 and that the muscle tension headaches that have been diagnosed
more recently are not unusual in any given individual.
As a

ORDER
RE: JOHN R. KIMBALL
PAGE 13

result, he states that there is no reason to relate them to the
motor vehicle accident that took place 16 months before. With
respect to the diagnostic studies ordered by Dr. Matick, he notes
that most of these were duplicative and unnecessary. He states
that the EEG was unnecessary as there was no history of seizures of
any type. • The MRIs, the SSEP study and the EMG were medically
unwarranted, per Dr. Knorpp, as there were no symptoms being
manifested to warrant these diagnostic studies. The MRI of the
cervical spine alone was possibly warranted to rule out a herniated
cervical disc, per Dr. Knorpp. With respect to the injections, Dr.
Knorrp concludes that use of therapeutic injections for chronic
myofacial pain can be reasonable, if used judiciously (i.e.
intermittently for pain exacerbation not amenable to other
treatment) if the individual receiving the injections experiences
significant and substantial, prolonged benefit from the therapy.
Dr. Humphrey's use of more than 3 series of injections, where no
significant lasting improvement was noted, was palliative and
promoted treatment dependency, per Dr. Knorpp.
With respect to the period of time off work in 1994 and
1995, Dr. Knorpp states that there was no need to consider the
applicant disabled during this period of time based solely on his
subjective symptomatology.
He noted that the November 8, 1994
functional capacity evaluation did not provide enough information
on which to base a finding of disability and he noted that the
evaluator simply restated that he understood that the applicant was
already under a doctor imposed lifting restriction of no more than
10 pounds. Dr. Knorpp's recommendations for the applicant were as
follows:
quit
smoking,
stop
injection
therapy,
start
aerobic/cardiovascular conditioning, see a doctor experienced in
chronic pain management (one who recommends maximizing use of antidepressants) , quit narcotic, muscle relaxant and anti-inflammatory
therapy as it has no proven benefit for long-term control of
myofacial type pain and can be habit forming, get vocational
rehabilitaion and have a formal functional capacity evaluation to
objectify his safe work capacities.
With respect to the
applicant's headaches, Dr. Knorpp concluded that there were multifactorial in origin, with the cervicothoracic muscle strain
suffered at the time of the industrial motor vehicle accident being
a portion of the origin. Nonetheless, Dr. Knorpp states that
persistent cervicothoracic pain, with or without headaches, is not
disabling.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ declines to refer this case to a medical panel and
finds that the report of Dr. Knorpp is not admissable for the
purpose of establishing a medical controversy regarding the
treatment regimen and time off work beginning in July of 1994. The
problems with Dr. Knorpp's report relate to the procedures followed
by the carrier in obtaining the report. The procedural problems
with the report that the ALJ is most concerned with are: 1) the
failure of Dr. Knorpp to examine the applicant and 2) the fact that
the report was obtained after the carrier had already obtained one
second opinion from another physician, who did examine the
applicant, but whose opinion was not favorable to the carrier.
Failure to examine the applicant:
The ALJ feels that the failure to examine the applicant
creates foundational problems with Dr. Knorpp's conclusions,
especially considering the fact that all other physicians involved
in this matter, who offered different opinions from that of Dr.
Knorrp, did examine the applicant. As noted at hearing, it may be
that examining the applicant is not always necessary in order for
the physician to offer a well-founded medical opinion on a
contested issue. On certain medical issues, examination results
may be irrelevant.
This is sometimes the case with simple
causation questions.
If the question is merely what event
preciptated the development of a condition or caused an injury to
occur, the present medical condition of the applicant may be
irrelevant.
However, when the contested issue deals with the
appropriate treatment advisable, the present medical condition of
the applicant would seem to be extremely relevant.
In this case, the appropriate treatment for the applicant's
condition is the main contested issue. Dr. Knorpp concedes some
treatment related to the 1993 industrial motor vehicle accident is
still warranted, he just feels that a different treatment regimen
than what has been recommended by Dr. Humphreys and Dr. Yelton
should be followed. However, without examining the applicant, the
ALJ cannot see how Dr. Knorpp can offer a well-founded opinion
regarding what treatment is warranted, or not warranted. Certainly
the well-accepted standard in the medical field is that examination
of the patient is a pre-requisite to recommending appropriate
medical care. In addition, with respect to second medical opinions
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sought by the carrier, the ALJ should note that the Commission rule
(R578-1-4 (H)) states that the carrier/employer is entitled to an
"independent medical examination11 (emphasis added) • This suggests
that one medical report sought by the carrier and based on an
examination should be admitted.
The Commission rules do not
address reports based on medical* record reviews conducted by
physicians.
As a result, the ALJ sees no inference of
admissability for these reports in the rules, and it would
logically follow that these reports should be admissable at the
discretion of the ALJ, depending on their reliability and their
relevance to the issue to be decided. Based on the foundational
concerns noted above, the ALJ declines to admit Dr. Knorpp's record
review report for purpose of establishing a medical controversy
regarding the appropriate treatment regimen for the applicant.

Additional second opinions obtained by the carrier:
As noted above, the Industrial Commission rules (in
particular R578-1-4 (H)) allow the carrier the opportunity to have
the applicant examined by a physician of its choice. The rule
specifically indicates the right to one second opinion examination.
The rule was undoubtedly promulgated with recognition that
differing opinions within the medical community regarding
causation, advisable treatment and other issues are not uncommon.
If the second opinion obtained by the employer/carrier conflicts
with the applicant's treating physician's opinion, then the matter
is generally sent to a medical panel by the ALJ for additional
medical input.
This process allows for indentification of a
medical controversy and resolution of that controversy by the ALJ
after obtaining sufficient medical expert advice. The process is
generally viewed as a fair and reasonable means of resolving
medical controversy on contested issues, but the process does add
considerably to the period of time that the parties spend in
litigation.
Although the Commission has interpreted the rule
liberally to allow the employer/carrier to obtain additional second
opinions when new issues arise over the course of managing a claim
on a given industrial accident, in order to prevent the necessity
of sending every medical issue on every case to a medical panel and
thereby increasing the nuiaber of cases involving lengthy, complex
litigation, the Commission has not allowed the carrier/employer
more than one second opinion on a given issue.
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If the Commission were to allow for more than one second
opinion on a given issue, the next question would be, if two were
allowed, why not three or four. In essence, this would allow the
carrier/employer to keep getting additional medical opinions until
it got one that supported the least-costly alternative for the
employer/carrier, forcing the applicant to go through Commission
litigation and a medical panel referral in every case where the
carrier did not like the opinion of the treating physician on a
given issue. The ALJ finds that interpreting the Commission rule
this liberally creates unnecessarily lengthy litigation heavily
weighted in favor of the party that can afford to keep getting
additional medical opinions.
Considering the undesirable
consequenecs that would follow, the ALJ can see no reason why the
Commission rule should be interpreted this liberally. The ALJ
finds that it is more logical and fair to limit the
employer/carrier to one second opinion evaluation on any one given
major medical issue. This allows for each party to offer an
opinion supportive of its posiiton, without providing one party
with an unfair advantage over the other.
The instant case is illustrative of a situation where the
carrier was seeking a medical opinion that provided for a lesscostly means of managing the applicant's claim. When the initial
second opinion of Dr. Yelton was not supportive of a less-costly
regimen of treatment, the carrier sought out a third opinion. The
carrier<s cost-containment concerns in this case are further
emphasized by the carrier's reluctance to pay travel expenses for
the applicant to come to Utah for the third-opinion examination.
Although the ALJ can understand that the carrier has costcontainment concerns, the Commission cannot be in the position of
interpreting its procedural rules to assist one party in addressing
its- concerns (i.e. by admitting an unlimited number of medical
opinion reports, even if they are not well-founded) while ignoring
the concerns of the opposing party. The carrier also noted at
hearing that it had many problems trying to manage the applicant7s
claim, as he resides outside of Utah, and the carrier noted regrets
in hiring Intracorp to oversee the applicant's treatment regimen,
as in retrospect, Intracorp chose a physician that ended up merely
agreeing with the treating physician's lengthy and costly treatment
regimen. Once again, the Commission cannot take the carrier's case
managment problems into account in deciding how it should interpet
the litigation procedure rules in any given case. The most fair
way to interpret the Coiamission mile regarding employer/carrier
sought second opinions is to allow just one second opinion
examination at a time.
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Based on the foregoing discussion, the ALJ feels she must
refuse to admit the opinion of Dr. Knorpp, as poorly founded and
improperly obtained per Commission rule. Based on the opinions of
Dr. Humphreys and Dr. Yelton, it appears that the treatment regimen
offered at least through the end of 1994 was reasonably medically
necessary as a result of the industrial accident of March 15, 1993.
Dr. Fenwick and Dr. Humphreys appear to indicate that the applicant
remained medically unstable at least through the end of 1994 and
thus the ALJ will award medical expenses and temporary total
compensation (TTC) through December 31, 1994. The medical record
exhibit has very little medical information for 1995, but the ALJ
notes that, by February of 1995, Dr. Humphreys was spacing out the
injections more and was indicating his feeling that he did not
anticipate the applicant improving significantly in the future. It
appears therefore that the applicant was approaching medical
stability at that point. The ALJ will not try to pick a point of
medical stability after of January 1, 1995, because of the minimal
information for 1995 that the ALJ has before her. The ALJ hopes
that the parties will be able to come to an agreement on a date of
medical stability in 1995. If an agreement cannot be reached,
updated medical information can be submitted and the ALJ will
reopen the matter for consideration of the medical stability issue.
At this point, the ALJ will simply award benefits through December
31, 1994 and leave the period thereafter to be settled by the
parties or litigated in the future, if necessary.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Stampede
Trucking, Inc./Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay the
applicant, John R. Kimball, temporary total compensation at the
rate of $167.00 per week, for 23.286 weeks, or $3,888.76, for the
period of medical instability associated with the March 15, 1993
industrial accident, from July 22, 1994 through December 31, 1994.
That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus
interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney
fees to be awarded below.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Stampede Trucking,
Inc./Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay all medical expenses
incurred as the result of the March 15, 1993 industrial accident,
including the expenses incurred for the treatment offered during
the period of July 22, 1994 through December 31, 1994; said
expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee
schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Stampede Trucking,
Inc./Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay T. Jeffery Cottle,
attorney for the applicant, the sum of $777.75, plus 20% of the
interest payable on the award, per Commission rule R568-1-7, for
services.rendered in this matter, the same to be deducted from the
aforesaid award to the applicant, and to be remitted directly to
the office of T. Jeffery CQttle.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject tq review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b12(2) Utah Code Annotated.

DATED this(^' day of April, 1995.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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Attorney at Law
387 West Center Street
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Attorney at Law
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Exhibit B
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DECISION

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
•JOHN R, KIMBALL,

*

Applicant,

*
*
*

vs.

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

STAMPEDE TRUCKING and WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,

*
*

Case No. 94-0967

#

Defendants.

*

Stampede Trucking and The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
(referred to jointly as "Stampede") ask The Industrial Commission
of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits
to John R. Kimball pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utan Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.

ISSUES UNDER REVIEW
Stampede raises the following issues in its motion for review:
1) Is Dr. Knorpp's report admissible as evidence in this
proceeding? 2) Should the ALJ have referred Mr. Kimball's claim to
a medical panel? 3) Are the ALJ's findings and conclusions
sufficient?

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Industrial Commission adopts the ALJ's exhaustive
recitation of the subsidiary facts regarding Mr. Kimball's claim.
The Industrial Commission's file provides additional information on
the procedural aspects of this case. The facts material to this
motion for review are summarized below:
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On March 15, 1993, Mr. Kimball was in a traffic accident while
working for Stampede. He received medical treatment for various
injuries, including neck and upper back strain. He returned to
work during August 1993. Stampede paid workers' compensation
benefits arising from Mr. Kimball's accident.
Several months later, Mr. Kimball began suffering severe
headaches. During July 1994, on instruction from his physician,
Mr. Kimball left work and commenced an additional course of medical
treatment.
Mr. Kimball then requested additional workers'
compensation benefits from Stampede on the theory that his
continuing medical complaints were caused by his prior industrial
accident.
Mr. Kimball's claim was supported by the medical
opinions of his treating physicians.
Stampede denied Mr. Kimball's claim and employed Dr. Yelton to
perform what is commonly referred to as an *independent medical
evaluation" (WIME") of Mr. Kimball's medical condition.
In the
meantime, Mr. Kimball submitted an application for hearing to the
Industrial Commission.
On October 5, 1994, Dr. Yelton submitted his report to
Stampede.
Dr. Yelton concurred with Mr. Kimball's treating
physicians that Mr. Kimball's continuing medical problems were due
to his prior industrial accident. Dr. Yelton also concluded that
Mr. Kimball's medical care was reasonably necessary.
On November 1, 1994, the Industrial Commission's Adjudication
Division instructed Stampede to answer Mr. Kimball'-s application
for hearing.
Stampede did so on November 14, 1994,^ generally
denying liability. On January 3 # 1995, the Adjudication Division
scheduled Mr. Kimball's claim for hearing on March 7, 1995.
On February 27, 1995, Stampede employed Dr. Knorpp to review
Mr. Kimball's medical records.
Dr. Knorpp's report was not
submitted to opposing counsel until 4:37 p.m. on March 6, 1995, the
day before the hearing. The report was not included in Stampede's
medical exhibit. At no time did Stampede request a continuance of
the hearing.
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At the hearing on Mr. Kimball's claim, Stampede offered Dr.
Knorpp's report into evidence.
The ALJ refused to accept the
report on the grounds it lacked foundation and contravened
Industrial Commission rules.
The ALJ also denied
Stampede's
request that Mr. Kimball's claim be referred to a medical panel.
The ALJ ultimately ruled that Mr. Kimball's continuing medical
problems were the result of his industrial accident, that his
medical care through 1994 was necessary to treat his industrial
injuries, and that Mr. Kimball was entitled to the requested
medical benefits and disability compensation, also through 1994.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Stampede argues: 1) the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Knorpp's
report; 2) The ALJ erred in not appointing a medical panel; and 3)
The ALJ's findings and conclusions are insufficient.
The
Industrial Commission will address each of these issues.
I.

Dr. Knorpp's report.

The ALJ expressed two reasons for rejecting Dr. Knorpp's
report. The first reason was that because Dr. Knorpp was not given
an opportunity to personally examine Mr. Kimball, the report lacked
sufficient foundation to warrant admission as evidence.
While the Industrial Commission would not have rejected the
report in question solely because Dr. Knorpp did not personally
examine Mr. Kimball, the Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ
that the persuasive force of the report is severely diminished for
that reason* Thus, even if the report had been admitted, it would
be entitled to very little weight.
The ALJ's second reason for rejecting Dr. Knorpp's report
relates to the Industrial Commission's Rule R568-1-4.H:
. . . The defendant may also require the applicant to
submit to an independent medical examination to be
conducted by a physician of the defendant's choice.
i
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The ALJ interpreted the foregoing rule as limiting Stampede to
only one IME. The ALJ reasoned that since Stampede had previously
obtained an IME from Dr. Yelton, it could not submitted a second
report from Dr. Knorpp.
In the Industrial Commission's view, Rule R568-1-4.H does not
control the admissibility of Dr. Knorpp's report.
Instead, the
rule only explains and limits an applicant's duty to cooperate with
IME's on behalf of defendants.
The rule does not limit the
admissibility of other medical evidence, such as Dr. Knorpp's
report. Consequently, Rule R568-1-4.H does not support the ALJ's
rejection of Dr. Knorpp's report.
While not adopting the ALJ's specific reasons for rejecting
Dr. Knorpp's report, the Industrial Commission nevertheless
concludes that under the circumstances of this case, the report is
inadmissible because the Industrial Commission's Rule R568-1-4.J
required Stampede to file all medical records at least one week
prior to the hearing. Dr. Knorpp's report, which was not filed
until the time of the hearing, did not comply with Rule R568-1-4.J.
The Industrial Commission's rules are not intended or applied
to deprive parties of reasonable opportunity to present their
cases. However, in this case Stampede failed to take timely steps
to gather its evidence and as a consequence was unable to meet the
disclosure requirements set forth in the Industrial Commission's
rules. In particular, even though Stampede knew in October 1994
that the report it had obtained from Dr. Yelton was unfavorable,
Stampede did not commission Dr. Knorpp's report until only eight
days prior to the hearing. The report was not completed until five
days prior to hearing and Stampede did not provide a copy to
opposing counsel until the eve of the hearing. The ALJ did not
receive the report until the hearing itself. Furthermore, Stampede
did not request that the hearing be continued to allow for proper
disclosure of the report.
Under these circumstances, the Industrial Commission finds no
basis for excusing Stampede from the requirements of Rule R568-14.J.
The Industrial Commission therefore concludes that Dr.
Knorpp's report is inadmissible.
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II. Referral to a medical panel.
Stampede contends the ALJ should have referred Mr. Kimball's
claim to a medical panel for review. Section 35-1-77 of the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act grants the Industrial Commission
discretion to convene medical panels. The Industrial Commission
exercises such discretion according to its Rule R568-1-9, which
provides in material part as follows:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law
Judge where:
1.
One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(c) medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.
In this case, Dr. 'Knorpp's report is the only support for
Stampede's claim that a significant medical issue exists.
For
reasons discussed above, Dr. Knorpp's report has not been accepted
as evidence in this matter. All other medical evidence indicates
that the medical treatment in question has been reasonable and
necessary. The Industrial Commission therefore concludes that no
significant medical issue exists and that no medical panel is
necessary.
III.

Sufficiency of the ALJ's findings and decision.

Stampede contends the ALJ failed to address the following
issues: 1) What was the condition for which Mr. Kimball was being
treated during July, 1994 forward? 2) Was the condition medically
causally related to the industrial accident of March 15, 1993? 3)
Was the treatment rendered reasonable and medically necessary? 4)
Was the Applicant temporarily totally disabled from July 22, 1994
forward as a direct result of the industrial injury?
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The foregoing questions are answered in any fair reading of
the ALJ's decision, but for purposes of clarity, the Industrial
Commission finds and concludes as follows:* Since July 1994, Mr.
Kimball has been treated for frontal occipital headaches, severe
neck and shoulder pain, and myofacial syndrome . Such conditions
were medically caused by the industrial accident of March 15, 1993.
The treatment rendered on behalf of Mr. Kimball through 1994 was
reasonable and medically necessary. Mr. Kimball was temporarily
totally disabled after July 22, 1994 until at least January 1,
1995.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and
denies Stampede's motion for review. It is so ordered.
Dated this o<7 day of September, 1995.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission
within 20 days of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party
may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a
petition for review with that court within 30 days of the date of
this order.
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